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BAR BRIEFS
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS

In State of -North Dakota, Pltf. and Resp., vs. James P. Colohan, Deft.
and Applt.
That where no exceptions to the charge given the jury are taken and
filed, specifications of error based thereon will not be considered on appeal.
That alleged prejudice to the rights of the defendant based upon the
action of the court in receiving the verdict of a jury In another case during
the trial of the case at bar will not be considered on appeal when the alleged
error was never called to the attention of the trial court, no objection to the
action of the court taken, and when It was not made the basis of motion for
a new trial. Matters not shown by the record can not be considered.
That where, after entering a plea of "not guilty", the defendant requested and obtained leave of the court to withdraw the plea for the purpose of
entering a demurrer, and thereafter, when the demurrer was overruled, proceeded to trial without re-entering a plea, and testimony was taken and the
case submitted to the Jury upon the evident theory that a plea of "not guilty"
had been entered, the inadvertent omission of entry of plea is not reversible
error when the accused is allowed to make his defense as fully and effectively
as if issue had been joined over the overruling of the demurrer and no injury
to the substantial rights of the defendant appears.
That the provisions of section 61 of the constitution of the state, to-wit:
"No bill shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed
in its title, but a bill which violates this provision shall be invalidated
thereby only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed,"
are to be construed liberally. It is not intended that the title should be an
index or a catalog of the details of the act, and these provisions are fully met
when the various subjects embrased therein are germane and reasonably connected with the subject expressed in the title and when all the provisions of
the act are consistent with its avowed purpose.
That Chapter 162 of the Session Laws of 1927, being "An Act Regulating
the Operation of Vehicles on Highways * " is not open to attack on the
ground that the bill embraces more than one subject because the bill includes
section 2 and section 62 legislating against operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquors and providing punishment therefor.
The statute is a comprehensive one, designed to control and regulate the operation of motor vehicles upon highways and to make uniform the law relating to the subject matter. The statute provides methods for the enforcement
of the act and these features of enforcement are germane to the general
subject.
That said chapter 162 of the Session Laws of 1927 is not open to attack on
the ground that it contains the provisions of sections 2 and 62, without having the same expressed in the title when the title to the act states explicitly
that the act provides for the enforcement of its provisions.
That chapter 162 of the Session Laws of 1927 is not repealed or annulled
'by chapter 175 of the Session Laws of 1933 authorizing a city to prohibit by
ordinance the driving of a motor vehicle upon its streets by anyone under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.
That section 62 of chapter 162 of the Session Laws of 1927 authorizes the
trial court to sentence a person convicted of operating a motor vehicle on the
public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquors to pay a
fine, or to be imprisoned in the county jail, or both, and in case the court
sentences the defendant to imprisonment, the court may suspend the sentence
of imprisonment or any part thereof and make its order that the person so
sertenced shall 'be precluded from driving any automobile within this state for
a period of not to exceed two years; but it is only in case the sentence of Imprisonment is suspended that the court may enter such restraining order.
That where the trial court sentences a -person convicted of the crime of
operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of the state while under the influence of intoxicating liquors to pay a fine and to suffer imprisonment for a
definite period stated In the sentence and judgment, and enters a restraining
order precluding the defendant from operating a motor vehicle on the highways for a defined period without suspending the sentence of imprisonment,
said sentence will be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court with
instructions to pass sentence within the limits prescribed by statute.
Appeal from the County Court of Cass County with Increased Jurisdiction.
Hon. P. M. Paulsen, Judge. CONVICTION A.FF"RMED AND CASE REMANDED FOR RE-SENTUNCE. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.

